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IN THE UTAH COl 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
WESLEY SCOTT WHITMORE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
QRT OF APPEALS 
CaseNo.20020471-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The narrow issue on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying 
Whitmore's motion to withdraw his plea, or in the alternative, to declare a misplea, after 
Whitmore established a prima facie case that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
at the entry of plea hearing. Despite a complete lack of evidence on the record to refute 
Whitmore's prima facie case, the State attempts to cloud the real issue by arguing that 
Whitmore has failed to meet his burden of proof. This tactic is understandable given that 
the alternative is to argue that denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the entry 
of plea hearing is not sufficient good cause to justify granting a motion to withdraw pleas. 
However, the State's assertion that Whitmore has failed to establish that 
previous counsel ("Mr. Gale") rendered ineffective assistance is untenable. That previous 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment and Whitmore was prejudiced thereby is amply supported with the only 
evidence on record. Mr. Gale's affidavit states that he failed to investigate relevant law, 
thereby objectively establishing ineffective assistance as a matter of law. The State 
presented no evidence to refute this fact. Both Mr. Gale's affidavit and Whitmore's 
proffered testimony state that Whitmore waived his constitutional rights and entered 
guilty pleas because he believed he had no legal defense to the charges, thereby 
establishing the requisite prejudice. 
This evidence on the record established a prima facie case of ineffective 
assistance below, shifting the burden to the State. In response, the State presented no 
evidence to contradict Whitmore's claims, and the State raised no objections to 
Whitmore's evidence. The record further shows that the State did not request an 
evidentiary hearing. The State's utter and complete failure to refute Whitmore's evidence 
does nflt inexplicably shift the burden back to Whitmore to reestablish ineffective 
assistance, as the State now claims. Further, a motion for remand to the trial court under 
Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is not proper in this case because the 
undisputed facts supporting Whitmore's claims appear fully on the record, and the State 
could have made such a motion under that rule. Further, the State could have requested a 
hearing or submitted affidavits if it wanted to present evidence contrary to Whitmore's 
claims, rather than inappropriately speculating about the possibilities regarding 
Whitmore's motives. Speculation is not evidence. 
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The State's citations to the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI") in its Brief 
violates statutory restrictions. The State's failure to create a record below does not give 
the State license to improperly reference the PSI in this appeal. The PSI is a confidential 
document, the contents of which are classified protected under statute and are not 
available except for the limited purposes of sentencing. Although the PSI is not helpful 
to the State, the information contained in the PSI cannot be used as evidence to support 
the State's arguments in any way or at any time under the strict statutory restrictions 
governing the limited use of that confidential document. Accordingly, this Court may not 
consider any of the information contained in the PSI as evidence. 
For the same reasons stated above relative to previous counsel's ineffective 
assistance, Whitmore was alternatively entitled to a declaration of a misplea. Whitmore's 
obvious reliance upon Mr. Gale's incorrect legal advice that mistake as to an alleged 
victim's age was no defense to the charge resulted in Whitmore entering guilty pleas 
unknowingly and involuntarily, thus establishing the "manifest necessity" required for the 
trial court to declare a misplea. The State's implication that this issue is improperly 
before this Court is without legal support. The State further fails to properly brief the 
issue and to explain how the circumstance of "ineffective assistance of counsel" and 
"absence of counsel" would be treated differently under the misplea analysis or how that 
alleged distinction would affect the result in this case. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN TO REFUTE 
WHITMORE'S PRIMA FACIE CASE THAT HIS PREVIOUS 
COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE. 
The State claims that Whitmore's pleas "were properly taken and entered." 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE, p. 6. The State further claims that Whitmore failed to meet his 
burden of proof establishing Mr. Gale's ineffective assistance and resulting prejudice 
under the analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984). The 
State's assertions are without merit and particularly puzzling in light of the only evidence 
on the record, comprising Mr. Gale's affidavit and Whitmore's proffered testimony. 
Contrary to the State's implication, there is no other evidence on the record to marshal 
because the State never provided any evidence. Moreover, Mr, Gale's affidavit provides 
undisputed proof that Mr. Gale failed both to investigate clearly relevant law, to correctly 
advise Whitmore, and as a result, Whitmore was prejudiced by reliance upon Mr. Gale's 
incorrect advice (R. 71). Whitmore's proffered testimony provides additional undisputed 
evidence that he was prejudiced by Mr. Gale's ineffective assistance (R. 145: 4). Simply 
put, Whitmore would not have accepted the State's plea offer but for Mr. Gale's incorrect 
advice (Id.). This evidence met both prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel 
analysis and established a prima facie case, shifting the burden to the State. 
To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
establish (1) that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
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professional judgment; and (2) that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficient 
performance such that the outcome of the proceeding would likely have been different. 
See. Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626, 636 (Utah 2001). Because Whitmore met both 
prongs of this analysis in the trial court below, previous counsel's ineffective assistance is 
not an issue in this appeal. Mr. Gale's failure to be informed of and correctly advise 
Whitmore regarding the relevant law, particularly UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-304.5 which 
provides that Unlawful Conduct with a 16 or 17 Year Old is not a strict liability offense, 
constitutes conduct that fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment. Prejudice resulted when Whitmore was persuaded by Mr. Gale that because he 
had no defense, he should waive his constitutional rights, including his right to a jury trial 
and his right to a preliminary hearing, and plead guilty (R. 71; R. 145: 4). The outcome 
of the entry of plea hearing would have been different if Whitmore had been correctly 
advised that his mistaken belief regarding Ms. Stone's age was a defense to the charges 
(Id.). Accordingly, Whitmore provided more than sufficient evidence in support of his 
claim and thereby met his burden of proof. 
In contrast, the State presented no evidence to contradict or refute Mr. Gale's 
affidavit or Whitmore's proffer, nor has the State ever requested an evidentiary hearing 
for that purpose. In fact, the State's Brief is conspicuously lacking in any citations to the 
record referencing evidence presented by the State. Instead, the State improperly 
attempts to supplement the record with the Presentence Investigation Report, which 
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improper use will be addressed below. Although the State now claims that Whitmore has 
failed to marshal the evidence and meet his burden of proof, Whitmore has marshaled the 
only evidence on the record. 
With that prima facie evidence, the burden shifted to the State where it remained 
unchallenged. The issue on this appeal, therefore, is not whether previous counsel was 
ineffective, but whether the trial court erred in denying Whitmore's motion to withdraw 
his guilty pleas or to declare a misplea in light of trial counsel's proven ineffectiveness. 
Moreover, if merited , the State could have requested remand to the trial court under Rule 
23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure - it is not Whitmore's responsibility to 
assist the State with its evidence. However, Whitmore's claim for ineffective assistance 
has consistently gone unopposed. Whether the State was negligent in prosecuting this 
case or simply opted to not challenge Whitmore's evidence, Whitmore should not be 
penalized because of the State's abject failure to create a record. Accordingly, the State's 
argument that Whitmore has failed to meet his burden of proof is without merit and 
contrary to the law cited below. 
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL HAS BEEN 
ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Whitmore's claim of ineffective assistance was not 
!A motion under Rule 23B should not be granted under these facts because that 
provision is only available "upon a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not folly appearing 
in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was 
ineffective." UTAH R. APP. P. 23B (emphasis added). 
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directly disputed in the trial court, Mr. Gale's affidavit (R. 71) establishes ineffective 
assistance of counsel as a matter of law. See, BRIEF OF APPELLANT, p. 9 ("A showing 
that counsel was ignorant of the facts or the law constitutes ineffectiveness. State v. 
McNichoL 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976)."). See also. State v. Ross. 951 P.2d 236, 246 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997) ("Knowledge of the law is a basic prerequisite to providing competent 
legal assistance. If an attorney does not investigate clearly relevant law, then he or she 
has objectively failed to provide effective assistance." (emphasis added)). The State's 
mischaracterization of Mr. Gale's failure to investigate relevant law as "neglectful" but 
"not legally deficient" (BRIEF OF APPELLEE, p. 10, fn. 3) although perhaps creative is 
simply wrong. 
As set forth in his affidavit, Mr. Gale failed to investigate relevant law, thus 
establishing the fact that his conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment and constituting ineffective assistance as a matter of law. State v. 
Ross, 951 P.2d at 246. The law requires only a "showing" that counsel was ignorant of 
the facts and the law to constitute ineffectiveness. State v. McNichoL 554 P.2d at 205. 
In this case, Mr. Gale has provided a sworn statement admitting that he was ignorant of 
the facts and law when he advised Whitmore to accept the State's plea offer. Contrary to 
the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-304.52 which was in force prior to the events 
2The statute establishes those sex crimes in Title 76, Chapter 5 that are strict liability 
offenses where mistake as to an alleged victim's age is no defense. Section 76-5-401.2 is not a 
strict liability offense and thus mistake as to an alleged victim's age is an appropriate defense to 
the charge. Because this statute and Section 76-5-401.2 were in force prior to the events in this 
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alleged in this case and which establishes that mistake as to a victim's age is a defense to 
the crime for which Whitmore was charged, Mr. Gale incorrectly advised Whitmore that 
his mistaken belief that the alleged victim, Emily Stone, was over the age of 18 was no 
defense. 
Because § 76-2-304.5 was enacted prior to the facts alleged in this case, Mr. 
Gale should have been familiar with that provision prior to advising Mr. Whitmore. In 
fact Whitmore told counsel he thought the alleged victim was older than 18, intuitively 
believing that his mistake should be a defense, whereupon a discussion ensued relative to 
the legal ramifications of this mistaken belief (R. 71). Upon Mr. Gale's assurance that 
Whitmore's mistake was no defense to the charge because it was a strict liability offense, 
Whitmore opted to not proceed to trial in light of his admission that he had sexual 
relations with Ms. Stone (R. 71; R. 145:4). Accordingly, and believing he had no 
defense, Whitmore waived his constitutional rights, accepted the State's plea offer, and 
plead guilty to reduced charges (Id.). 
Upon learning of his mistake, Mr. Gale informed the trial court that he had 
wrongly advised Whitmore regarding possible defenses and subsequently filed a motion 
to withdraw Whitmore's pleas (R. 71: 3). This motion resulted solely from Mr. Gale's 
wrongly advising Whitmore that his mistake as to the victim's age was no defense to the 
charges of Unlawful Sexual Conduct With a 16 or 17 Year Old. Whitmore would not 
case, Mr. Gale should have known that mistake as to the victim's age was a defense to the 
charges against Whitmore. 
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have accepted the State's plea offer and plead guilty if Mr. Gale had correctly advised 
him (R. 71; R. 145: 4). The record substantiates no more and no less than these facts set 
forth in this paragraph3, despite the trial court's improper and prejudicial comments on 
the evidence, accusations, and attempts to cross-examine Whitmore during oral 
arguments on Whitmore's motion (See, fn. 5, infra). Based upon the foregoing facts and 
law, prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance as a matter of law. 
III. WHITMORE WAS PREJUDICED AS A RESULT OF PREVIOUS 
COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE. 
The State cites State v. Martinez, 26 P.3d 203 (Utah 2001)4 and State v. 
Huggins. 920 P.2d 1195 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 929 P.2d 350 (1996) in support of 
its argument that Whitmore has failed to establish the requisite prejudice caused by Mr. 
Gale's ineffective assistance. The State's reliance on Martinez appears misplaced given 
that the citation refers only to a table wherein the Utah Supreme Court grants a petition 
for writ of certiorari. There is no opinion addressing any legal issues, let alone the issue 
3The State's response to these facts on the record is an unsupported and 
inappropriate speculation that Whitmore may have been motivated to withdraw his pleas 
because the State has been unable to locate the victim, Emily Stone. Notwithstanding the 
fact that the State has not kept Whitmore apprised of the State's efforts in this regard, the 
State's speculative accusation is in bad faith and improperly implies that Mr. Gale has 
been less than straightforward in his affidavit. Rather than request an evidentiary hearing 
or otherwise properly present substantive evidence contradicting Whitmore's evidence on 
the record, the State ignores its burden and resorts to attempting to shoehorn in 
speculative facts designed to prejudice Whitmore. Accordingly, such unsupported 
allegations should be ignored. 
4The State's citation appears to have a typographical error in the citation as there is 
no 2001 case in the Pacific Report, Second Edition. 
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of prejudice resulting from ineffective assistance of counsel. Huggins, on the other hand, 
is more supportive of Whitmore's position than the State's. 
Despite the State's reliance on Huggins, this Court declined to reach the 
prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis in that case once it 
determined that counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment. State v. Huggins, 920 P.2d at 1199. This Court did 
explain, however, that the two-pronged analysis should not be "applied as a mechanical 
test but [is] meant to help us answer the ultimate question of whether the 'defendant 
receive[d] a fair trial.'" Id. at 1198 (citations omitted). This Court further stated, "[t]he 
Sixth Amendment imposes on counsel a duty to investigate, because reasonably effective 
assistance must be based on professional decisions[,] and informed legal choices can be 
made only after investigation of options." Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Therefore, the ultimate question in this case is whether the entry of plea hearing 
was fair. In other words, did Whitmore received a fair opportunity to make an informed 
and voluntary decision to waive his constitutional rights and plead guilty? In light of the 
only evidence on the record, the answer to that question is obviously "No." Whitmore's 
decision to plead guilty was misinformed, and therefore unknowing and involuntary. 
Furthermore, Whitmore never received a fair opportunity to investigate his options, 
particularly his defenses, because he did not know he had any. Whitmore plead guilty 
because he relied upon his counsel's inaccurate legal advice and consequently believed 
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that his mistake regarding Ms. Stone's age was no defense to the crimes with which he 
was charged. 
Accordingly, Whitmore has established that he was prejudiced by previous 
counsel's ineffective assistance. 
A. The Confidential PSI May Not Be Used to Remedy the State's 
Failure to Create a Record. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (3) (d) provides in pertinent part: 
The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic 
evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and 
are not available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by 
rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the department. 
Subsection 14 of that section provides in pertinent part: 
Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, 
are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government 
Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63-2-403 and 
63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the disclosure of a 
presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing 
pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the presentence 
investigation only when (a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-
202 (7 ) . . ." 
Section 63-2-202 (7) places restrictions on access to government records "properly 
classified private, controlled, or protected", recognizing the important privacy and 
confidentiality interests at stake. 
The State ignores these restrictions and improperly treats the PSI as if it were 
evidence for purposes of this appeal (See, i.e., BRIEF OF APPELLEE, pp. 15-16, 18). The 
State's inappropriate use of the PSI might be understandable in light of the fact that 
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evidence refuting Whitmore's claims of ineffective of assistance is conspicuously lacking 
from the record. However, although reliance on the PSI is not helpful to the State's 
position, the unauthorized use of the confidential PSI is clearly prohibited by the law and 
contrary to public policy supportive of the privacy and confidentiality interests at stake. 
The State's meritless allegation that Whitmore's proffer is "self-serving" (BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE, p. 13) ignores the facts set forth in Mr. Gale's affidavit and the additional 
glaring fact that the State failed to make any proper effort to refute this evidence. 
Further, the State's vague assertions that "the record casts doubt on the 
credibility of defendant's claim of prejudice as it reflects that many factors likely went 
into defendant's decision to plead guilty . . .", and that "[t]he record also reflects that 
defendant may harbor other motives for wanting to withdraw his pleas apart from the 
alleged deficient performance of counsel" (BRIEF OF APPELLEE, p. 14, (emphasis 
added)), are pure speculation not supported by a shred of evidence, nor does the State cite 
to the record where such "factors" and "other motives" are hidden. Perhaps the State is 
referring to Judge Lynn W. Davis's statements on the record when he improperly 
commented on the evidence (or lack thereof) by articulating unfounded suspicions 
regarding Whitmore's motives, and further manifested the trial court's abuse of discretion 
and prejudice against Whitmore (R. 145:20; Fn. 5, infra). Indeed, contrary to the State's 
bald assertion, there is no evidence on the record casting doubt on Whitmore's credibility, 
or anyone else's for that matter. There is plenty of speculation, however. 
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Notwithstanding various speculative and unsupported suggestions by the trial 
court and the State5 of what the facts might be, Whitmore can find no evidence in the 
record to support a finding that Whitmore's motives for moving to withdraw his pleas are 
any different than what he has claimed them to be. The trial court's clearly prejudicial 
5The trial court in fact directed several inappropriate comments to Whitmore that 
were unsupported by any evidence and demonstrated the trial court's prejudice and bias 
against Whitmore. During oral arguments on the motion to withdraw Whitmore's pleas 
or to declare a misplea, the trial court, absent any supporting evidence, made the 
following statements, inappropriately eliciting statements from Whitmore: 
THE JUDGE: 
DEFENDANT: 
He knew, he knew all of that. I mean, good grief, he sort of 
chooses the people he sleeps with as they come. He probably 
didn't know her last name, certainly didn't know his, her -
I don't even know her first name, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. There you go. 
DEFENDANT: She gave me a false name. 
THE JUDGE: 
DEFENDANT: 
See, you don't even know her first name. You may end up 
just choosing your victims if you sleep around. 
That's not the reason, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: You sort of choose your victims the way you find them. 
R. 145, p. 20. 
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speculations and unsupported accusations (see, fn. 5, supra) about Whitmore's motives 
for withdrawing his pleas are irrelevant to this appeal except to the extent that the trial 
court's conduct provides additional evidence that it abused its discretion in denying 
Whitmore's motions. 
In short, the trial court ignored Whitmore's evidence supporting his motions and 
the complete lack of evidence to the contrary and denied his motions based upon 
predisposed prejudice and unsupported speculation. At Oral Arguments on the motions, 
the State simply followed the trial court's lead and questioned Whitmore's possible 
motives for filing his motions, but never disputed the facts set forth in Mr. Gale's 
affidavit (R. 145: 15-19). Indeed, the State seemed unprepared as it relied on arguments 
set forth in a memorandum filed by a different prosecutor previously assigned to the case 
(R. 145: 15, 19), but seemed to have no loiowledge as to what those arguments were. The 
State's absurd threats that despite Ms. Stone's conceding that she had consensual sexual 
relations with Whitmore, if Whitmore succeeded in withdrawing his pleas, the State 
would amend the Information and charge him with two first degree felonies for rape (R. 
145: 15-19), further suggest that the State was not familiar with the law or the facts in this 
case. What the State did not do was present any evidence, credible or otherwise, that 
Whitmore was adequately represented by counsel. 
For purposes of determining whether to grant or deny Whitmore's motions, the 
only facts the trial court could lawfully take into consideration were those facts 
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established on the record. Given the State's failure to present any evidence refuting 
Whitmore's claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance, the trial court erred in 
denying Whitmore's motion to withdraw his pleas and his motion to declare a misplea. 
Based upon the foregoing facts and law, Whitmore was prejudiced such that he 
would have plead "Not guilty" and proceeded to trial, and therefore the outcome of the 
entry of plea hearing would have been different. Accordingly, the State's arguments that 
Whitmore was not prejudiced by Mr. Gale's defective performance contradict the law, 
common sense, and are without merit. 
IV. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
DENYING WHITMORE'S MOTION FOR A MISPLEA IS 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
The State implies that the issue of the trial court denying Whitmore's motion for 
a misplea is not properly before this court (BRIEF OF APPELLEE, p. 19-20). However, 
Whitmore preserved this claim below and the State's implication lacks any citation to 
legal authority. The State then reasserts that Whitmore has failed to establish his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, thus defeating the "manifest necessity" 
requirement set forth in the law. State v. Kav. 717 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Utah 1986). 
Because Whitmore has already addressed this issue above and set forth his arguments 
supporting declaration of a misplea in his Brief of Appellant, and because this issue is 
inadequately briefed by the State, Whitmore will not reargue the matter here. However, it 
is unclear how the State's unelaborated statement that "ineffective assistance of counsel" 
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and "absence of counsel" involve different inquiries under the misplea analysis (BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE, p. 21) applies to the facts in this case. It is impossible to determine whether 
the State is implying that the outcome of the misplea analysis would be different if his 
counsel were absent versus ineffective, or whether the statement is merely an exercise in 
semantic hairsplitting. The State does not explain the law or how it applies to the facts in 
this case. Either Whitmore was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at entry of 
plea or he was not. The State cannot seriously take the position that even if Whitmore 
was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at entry of plea, there is no manifest 
necessity because counsel was present, albeit ineffectively so. 
Of course, Whitmore does recognize that this issue will be moot if this Court 
finds that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Whitmore's motion to withdraw 
his pleas, and therefore this Court may decline to address it. Nonetheless, it would be 
helpful to have some legal precedent on this narrow issue in the event a defendant fails to 
timely file a motion to withdraw his pleas but otherwise can establish good cause for 
doing so. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and law, Appellant, Wesley Scott Whitmore, 
respectfully requests this Court to vacate his convictions in this case and to find that the 
trial court abused its discretion when it denied Whitmore's motions to withdraw his guilty 
pleas and his motion to declare a misplea. 
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Respectfully submitted this 'IX) day of June, 2003. 
Jennifer4C. Gowans 
Attorney for Defendant 
!^M>^ 
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